UNSC policy brief: the security implications of solar geo-engineering
This (mock) policy brief was written by me as part of an assignment when I was an International Relations student at the University of Groningen. I decided to publish the full text here for portfolio purposes. Please note that the content of the text does not necessarily reflect my personal opinion on the matter.
Your excellencies,
Climate change is a serious problem that will have a far-reaching impact on the livelihoods of billions around the globe. The urgency of this problem is recognised by countries and global organisations alike, resulting in various climate agreements aimed at reducing emissions. In spite of such climate agreements however, emissions keep rising globally and are not likely to be reduced on short notice. This causes scientific discussions on geo-engineering to become increasingly more serious, although not much attention is spent on this topic within the realm of politics yet (Dalby 2015, 191).
Geo-engineering typically comes in two distinct forms: carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and solar radiation management (SRM) (McLaren and Corry 2021, 20). CDR entails extracting carbon from the atmosphere and subsequently storing it into geological repositories. SRM in turn is aimed at reducing the influx of solar radiation responsible for warming up the globe (Vaughan and Lenton 2011, 745). The latter can be achieved by artificially producing clouds or making existing clouds larger and/or brighter (Dalby, 194). American government scientists argue that an international research programme should be established aimed at assessing the potential of solar geo-engineering as a measure to address climate change. Moreover, individual researchers have called for a special IPCC report on the potential of geo-engineering (Biermann et al. 2021, 1).
SRM is a technically feasible option that requires a low level of technology. However, the potential unforeseen consequences of SRM make it a rather controversial form of geo-engineering which causes significant opposition (Dalby 2015, 194). Most criticism of SRM geo-engineering is centred around ecological concerns, although comparatively little attention has been spent on security issues related to SRM, such as conflicts between states over its implementation as well as an expected securitisation of environmental politics (Corry 2017, 301).
The security challenges of SRM are commonly overlooked, yet are expected to have far-reaching global implications. This requires more attention to be spent on the global governance of geo-engineering. As the most important international body of security, the UN security council should therefore formulate a clear stance on how it envisages the role of geo-engineering measures such as SRM in light of security issues. Thereby, I present to you three policy options in this policy brief on the governance of SRM technology: maintain the status quo, prohibition and regulation.
Policy option 1: Maintain the status quo
The first policy option I present here prescribes the Security Council to take a laissez-faire stance regarding the issue of SRM geo-engineering by not taking action and maintaining the status quo. This policy option argues that scientists should not be obstructed in their research on geo-engineering methods and assumes that the security issues surrounding SRM are not as severe as commonly illustrated.
Maintaining the status quo and thereby allowing SRM to freely develop, leading up to the inevitable implementation of this form of geo-engineering will further securitise climate change. This is currently not the case, as important environmental campaigners do not argue for the use of exceptional measures (Corry, 305). Securitisation according to the Copenhagen school entails a securitising actor labelling a reference object of which it recognises its legitimate claim to survival to be under existential threat. This allows the securitising actor the right to protect this reference object against the threat illustrated, and therefore claims to have the right to invoke emergency measures to counter this threat (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 213–214). Within this paradigm, a country conceptualising climate change as a threat may therefore argue that an emergency measure such as SRM is a legitimate means to fight this threat. To what extent is this a problem?
There are reasons to assume as to why this securitisation is not necessarily a problem and may actually be beneficial. Mitigating climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions is argued to be the ideal solution. However, it would require states to ultimately stop using fossil fuels, which is expected to threaten national economies. This causes world leaders to rather act in their own economic interest rather than in global climatic interest (Chalecki and Ferrari 2018, 84). As such, an exceptional measure such as SRM geo-engineering by injecting particles in the stratosphere could be necessary to counter unsuccessful mitigation strategies and thus limit the security risks posed by climate change (Crutzen 2006, 211–212). Scholars in favour of the technique argue that some form of SRM is necessary to stay within reach of 1.5 degree warming targets and would reduce climate risks and damages for most people (MacMartin et al. 2018, 12–13). Considering that climate change is argued to be tied to a wide number of security issues, including but not limited to infectious diseases, arctic conflict and climate refugees (Chalecki and Ferrari, 83), further securitisation would thus allow SRM as an exceptional measure to be used to fight climate change and the security challenges brought by it.
It should be noted however that an emergency measure such as SRM brought under the securitisation of climate change is not particularly democratic. Civil rights and democratic processes may have been violated because the threat of climate change was deemed too urgent. The Copenhagen school prefers de-securitisation over securitisation, which allows the conceptualisation of a threat to be debated within the realm of politics, making it a more democratic process (Buzan and Hansen, 217). The envisioned democratic deficit regarding the implementation of SRM is also recognised by scholars, who argue that developing countries are most at risk for the effects of climate change as well as the potential detrimental effects of SRM, thereby exacerbating global injustice. Especially because there is severe doubt that those countries would have control over SRM technologies or would be granted those by developed countries (Bierman et al., 3). This ties to the Welsh school of security, which emphasises that security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin, and one actor should not deprive the other of security if the ultimate goal is durable security (Booth 1991, 319). Under unrestricted laissez-faire geo-engineering, this ideal is not feasible.
In sum, a policy of inaction is probably the easiest to pursue within the Security Council. While there are arguments in favour of using SRM technology to protect against security risks posed by climate change, the unavoidable securitisation of climate change will give less democratic oversight over the implementation of geo-engineering technologies. This contradicts the de-securitisation expressed by the Copenhagen school as well as the emancipatory aspect of security envisioned by the Welsh school.
Policy option 2: International prohibition
The second policy option advises the UN Security Council to declare a regime of prohibition surrounding the experimentation with and implementation of forms of geo-engineering related to solar radiation management. This would cause the use of SRM to be internationally prohibited, comparable to equivalent regulations regarding biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. In case this regime of prohibition were to be violated by a state or non-state actor, the security council should take appropriate action, for instance by sanctioning the specific violating actor. This policy option is comparable to a group of 16 scientists calling for an international non-use agreement of solar engineering, who call upon the United Nations “to take immediate and effective political control over the development of solar geoengineering technologies” (Bierman et al., 1).
There are various arguments against the use of SRM emphasising the grave security issues that this form of geo-engineering may cause, including warfare and other forms of interstate conflict. SRM is considered a cheap method of changing weather conditions, which allows states to unilaterally engage in this rogue form of geo-engineering (Corry, 303). As such, SRM allows a state as “free-driver” to unilaterally change conditions in another state or even on a global scale (Chalecki and Ferrari, 83). This illustrates a security issue, because the transboundary effects of SRM can negatively affect another state, thereby potentially sowing the seeds for interstate conflict (Dalby, 196–197). Because the effects of SRM on agriculture are largely unknown (Biermann et al., 2), this could lead to security problems related to the accessibility of food. A further race to the bottom could be caused by countries using SRM as counter geo-engineering: utilising SRM to protect themselves against negative externalities of geo-engineering practices by other states. Such a state of affairs would waste resources and could potentially spur further conflict (Heyen et al. 2019, 169).
Because the implementation of SRM is always intentional, it can be more easily perceived as an act of aggression compared to other factors. Greenhouse gas emissions are for instance considered a slow and unintended process affecting global weather conditions (Corry, 306). While the effects of SRM are comparable to that of a volcanic eruption temporarily cooling down the planet, a volcanic eruption is considered an unintended natural phenomenon. The ecological damage caused by SRM in another country may be unintended, although the decision to enact SRM is always intentional (Chalecki and Ferrari, 86–87). Emissions may therefore be highly damaging, yet the unintentionally causes them not to be securitised. This stands in contrast to SRM, which is always intentional and may therefore be easier to securitise. An actor can be blamed for its deliberate implementation and the subsequent negative externalities, regardless of how unintentional those might be. If those negative externalities are in fact unintentional, however. Militaries may also become increasingly interested in weaponising weather patterns to deliberately inflict damage on its enemy (Corry, 302).
For the reasons mentioned above, there is an argument to be made for the international prohibition of geo-engineering methods such as SRM. This is not unusual, considering that in the past states have banned mining in Antarctica, GFKs and offshore waste dumping (Biermann et al., 5). It should be noted however, that difficulties can be foreseen in reaching such a prohibition regime. Most notably, it is unexpected that a consensus among the five permanent member states of the Security Council would be reached outlawing or severely restricting this technology. China for instance has a history of weather modification efforts similar to SRM (Dalby, 197). It is therefore unlikely that China would vote in favour of a policy violating its scientific sovereignty. As such, regardless of how desirable this option may be, it is largely politically unfeasible.
Policy option 3: regulation of SRM
The third policy option prescribes that SRM and comparable forms of geo-engineering should not be prohibited nor should remain beyond the scope of the UN Security Council. Instead, the Security Council should call for a regime of regulation surrounding the use of SRM. This entails that the Security Council should call for more cooperation on and regulation of SRM and apply sanctions to “free-driving” actors who unilaterally engage in SRM beyond the restrictions set by the Security Security council. This policy option recognises both the possibilities of SRM in fighting climate change as well as the potential security risks frequently associated with this technology: it is realist in the sense that the technology is here to stay and constructivist in the sense that agreements can be reached to govern this technology.
As emphasised in the second policy option, the risk of “free-driving” states unilaterally implementing SRM technology in an anarchical system is a threat to cooperation, which may lead to security problems including interstate warfare. The ability to deploy SRM without broad international cooperation is commonly feared by critical scholars (Bierman et al., 4). However, this threat of free-driving can be overcome by designing institutions capable of regulating SRM on an international scale (Corry, 303). Further security problems related to free-driving can be mitigated through transparency and widespread availability of SRM technology. If only a handful of states are capable of deploying SRM technology, there is a high risk of free-driving. However, if all states are capable of deploying SRM, potential free drivers are better aware of the risks of a climate clash, thereby making it more likely that states cooperate on decisions regarding climate intervention (Heyen et al., 169). This relates to security concepts associated with nuclear weapons, such as mutual assured destruction (MAD) or second strike capability. Although it may seem radical to draw this comparison, even proponents of SRM stress that it “may prove as disruptive to the political order of the 21st century as nuclear weapons were for the 20th”, thereby stressing the need for new forms of global governance (Keith 2013, x–xi).
Under cooperation, rather than unilateral free-driving, a broader coalition of countries could apply SRM to counter more collective security threats related to climate change. More rapid climate change for instance is taking place regionally in the arctic. The melting of permafrost is expected to cause further emissions of carbon and methane, accelerating global climate change and thereby the security risks tied to it. (Crutzen, 216–217). Considering that the arctic is a vital region of geopolitical interest, it is important that the cooperation and leadership by the Security Council is vital to keep the peace in this region amidst the potential use of SRM geo-engineering. As completely outlawing SRM is politically difficult, a policy of cooperation on SRM could resolve tensions (Bennett et al. 2022, 6).
It should be noted however, that a risk commonly associated with SRM would be that it is considered an easy, cheap and quick solution to climate change, thereby invalidating global mitigation strategies aimed at reducing greenhouse gases (Chalecki and Ferrari, 88). This is particularly problematic, because emissions under SRM implementation would continue the process of ocean acidification (Vaughan and Lenton, 745). This further exemplifies the necessity of cooperation on SRM and other forms of geo-engineering, as international rules on the scope of implementation could be formed. As such, rules and guidelines could be formed stressing that SRM may be implemented complimentary to mitigation rather than as a replacement, as stressed by scholars promoting the use of SRM (MacMartin et al., 3).
As such, this policy option recognises that geo-engineering is here to stay and is quite difficult to ban internationally: the genie is out of the bottle. Considering this, it is important to establish adequate rules on the implementation that foster cooperation to counter security risks related to climate change. Particularly as a policy of non-interference on SRM would allow geopolitical security risks related to individual implementation to emerge on top of already pressing security risks related to climate change.
Policy recommendation
Your excellencies,
The three policy options included in this policy brief prescribe three distinct ways the UN Security Council could govern solar-geoengineering.
The first policy option prescribes a policy of non-action. Even though this policy option recognises how SRM can help counter the security risks posed by climate change, it also risks further securitisation of climate change and its politics. This could lead to a democratic and emancipatory deficit argued against by the two most prominent schools of security alike: the Copenhagen school and the Welsh/Aberystwyth school.
The second policy option on the contrary prescribes international prohibition of SRM technology and argues in favour of Security Council intervention in case of non-compliance. This is because the risk of free-driving — unilateral implementation of SRM — is thought to pose a great security risk. Negative externalities of SRM could unequally affect other states, states could wage “weather wars” by countering each other’s geo-engineering practices, not to mention the potential offensive military uses that can be attributed to SRM. Despite the desirability, it is uncertain that a consensus between the five member states of the Security Council would be reached in light of scientific sovereignty.
The third policy option prescribes more regulation enacted by the Security Council on geo-engineering. It recognises the security issues regarding free-riding as emphasised in the second policy option. Instead however, it argues that free availability of the technology makes states more likely to cooperate on the implementation, rather than resort to unilateral action. As such, states could collectively decide on the implementation of the technology to counter security risks posed by climate change. Additionally, regulation and cooperation would counter the risk that geo-engineering would be used in lieu of mitigation measures, rather than complimentary.
Considering the three available options, I would recommend pursuing the third option. This is because it regulates a technology that cannot be stopped anymore, it recognises its beneficial aspects and it is more politically feasible than prohibition. Considering the large security implications of SRM, I wish the delegates of the French Republic, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America lots of wisdom in making a decision.
Sincerely,
Olivier Grauss
